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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING SHOULTZ'S EXPERT WITNESSES. 
Should this Court reverse the trial court's ruling which granted Charles Shoultz's 
("Shoultz") motion for J.N.O.V. and alternative motion for a new trial, then Shoultz is entitled to 
a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Shoultz's expert witnesses. 
The trial court excluded Shoultz's expert testimony for two reasons: (1) Shoultz failed to 
designate any witnesses as experts prior to trial; and (2) the experts could not "give opinions as 
to what took place, with them not being there, and they're not being [sic] able to say what took 
place." (R. 341-42, 433, 441-42). Both reasons given by the trial court for the exclusion of 
Shoultz's witnesses amounted to an abuse of discretion. 
First, the trial court never imposed a deadline for the designation of expert witnesses. 
Even without such a judicial deadline, Gary Ricci ("Ricci") possessed notice over six weeks 
prior to trial that Shoultz planned on calling Snowbird employees as witnesses. The trial was 
held on March 11, 12 and 13, 1996. (R. 150-51, 209). On January 30, 1996, Shoultz's counsel 
mailed Ricci's counsel a letter in which the Snowbird employees were identified as witnesses. 
(See Correspondence of counsel attached in addendum). That notice gave Ricci's counsel an 
opportunity to depose the Snowbird employees, particularly Kenneth Bonar ("Bonar"). Those 
depositions occurred on February 20, 1996, nearly three weeks after Shoultz's counsel identified 
the Snowbird employees as witnesses. (See R. 120-29; 329-34). At the depositions Bonar 
testified in detail concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code. He opined that Ricci failed to 
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adhere to the code, and that his failure to do so caused the accident. (R. 333-34). Ricci had 
ample notice pertaining to Shoultz's attempt to elicit expert testimony at trial from the Snowbird 
employees. 
Second, under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the witnesses did not need to see the 
skiing accident in order to testify about the application and interpretation of the Skier's 
Responsibility Code to the facts of the case. Utah R. Evid. 703 (1997). Instead, Shoultz's expert 
witnesses could have offered testimony as to the application and interpretation of the code based 
on the respective version of events presented by both Ricci and Shoultz at trial. Utah R. Evid. 
702-705 (1997). As explained in further detail below, because the trial court's abuse of 
discretion pertaining to the exclusion of Shoultz's expert witnesses did not amount to harmless 
error, Shoultz is entitled to a new trial. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
UNDER A "CASE MANAGEMENT" ANALYSIS. 
A trial court may not exceed its procedural authority in making case management 
decisions governed by the rules of civil procedure. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 
830 P.2d 291, 296-97 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). In making 
those decisions with respect to the exclusion of witnesses, this Court has recognized that a trial 
court must be cautious. The exclusion of a witness from testifying is "extreme in nature and 
should be employed only with caution and restraint." Id. at 293 (quoting Plonkey v. Superior, 
475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970). Accordingly, this Court has held that absent a specific order 
which creates a judicially imposed deadline for the designation of witnesses, a court abuses its 
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discretion when it excludes expert testimony on the basis that a party did not designate such. Id. 
at 296. 
In other words, the trial court's decision to exclude Shoultz's expert witnesses was a 
case management decision. That decision was governed by the rules of procedure. However, the 
trial court exceeded its procedural authority granted by the rules when it excluded Shoultz's 
witnesses when no scheduling order was in place which created "a specific deadline for the 
disclosure of the final witness list." Id- at 296-97. 
The parties do not dispute that the trial court never imposed a deadline for the 
designation of expert witnesses. (See Reply Br. of Appellee at 21). The trial court excluded 
Shoultz's expert witnesses, in part, because Shoultz failed to designate the Snowbird employees 
as experts. (R. 433). Likewise, the court stated that Ricci "was entitled to have notice of expert 
witnesses, and entitled to find his own experts if he chose to do s o , . . . " (R. 433). The record 
shows, however, that Ricci possessed notice over six weeks prior to the trial that Shoultz planned 
on proffering expert testimony. (See R. 120-129; 329-34; Correspondence of counsel attached as 
addendum). 
The deposition of Kenneth Bonar ("Bonar") was taken on February 20, 1996. 
Bonar's deposition was taken by Ricci three weeks after Shoultz identified him as a witness to be 
called at trial. (Correspondence of counsel attached as addendum). Bonar is the Mountain 
Manager at Snowbird and is responsible for the overall operation of the ski resort. (R. 789). At 
his deposition, Bonar was asked whether he had formulated any opinions as to the cause of the 
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accident and whether the parties had violated the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 331-32). 
Bonar testified in depth concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code. He opined that Ricci failed 
to adhere to the code, and that his failure to do so caused the accident. (R. 333-34). That is, 
Ricci failed to (1) "[s]ki under control and in such a manner that [he could] stop or avoid other 
skiers . . . . " ; and (2) as the uphill or overtaking skier, Ricci had a duty to avoid Shoultz who was 
below Ricci. Id. These opinions, of course, represent expert testimony. 
Two weeks later, on March 8, 1996, Ricci filed a motion in limine to exclude 
Shoultz's expert testimony. (R. 120-29). No where in that motion or accompanying 
memorandum did Ricci claim that he would not have a chance to retain and prepare his own 
expert for trial purposes. Instead, Ricci argued that the expert testimony should be excluded for 
evidentiary purposes, not because of any lack of notice. (R. 120-29). Shoultz identified the 
Snowbird employees as witnesses on January 30, 1996. That identification gave Ricci ample 
opportunity to depose the Snowbird employees concerning their opinions as to the cause of the 
accident and the applicability of the Skiers Responsibility Code. Ricci cannot claim any surprise 
by Shoultz attempting to elicit expert testimony from the Snowbird employees, particularly 
Bonar. (See Reply Br. of Appellee at 21; R. 433). 
The trial court abused its discretion in excluding Bonar's expert testimony under a 
case management decision, which was governed by the rules of procedure. No express deadline 
was set as to the designation of expert witnesses. Even without an express deadline, Ricci 
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possessed notice prior to trial that Shoultz would elicit expert opinion pertaining to the Skier's 
Responsibility Code and its application to the respective versions of the accident in this case. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
UNDER AN EVIDENTIARY RULING ANALYSIS. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the expert testimony on the 
basis that Shoultz could not lay appropriate foundation. Prior to trial and pursuant to Rule 103 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence1, Shoultz made a proffer as to Bonar's expert testimony. (R. 432-
34). Shoultz indicated that Bonar would be qualified as an expert because of Bonar's 
knowledge, training and experience. (R. 432-435); see also Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 
1327 (Utah 1993)("formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving expert opinion, 
and a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue of his experience or training."). Bonar was 
Snowbird's Mountain Manager. Prior to that, he was employed as the ski patrol director and 
assistant mountain manager. (R. 789-90). As such, Bonar was extremely well qualified to 
render an opinion as to the enforcement, interpretation and application of the code to the facts of 
the ski accident. 
In his proffer, Shoultz also indicated that Bonar, because of his training and 
experience, would testify that there are generally accepted rules of conduct in skiing. Those rules 
of conduct are embodied in written form and published by the skiing industry as the Skier's 
1
 Ricci's assertion in his Reply Brief that Shoultz made no proffer of the subject 
testimony is clearly incorrect. The "substantial right" requirement of Rule 103 will be discussed 
infra Point II of this brief. 
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Responsibility Code. (R. 434). Shoultz indicated that a ski accident is not the same situation as 
an automobile accident, where the jury may be expected to be familiar with the rules as far as 
operating motor vehicles. Accordingly, Bonar would have been able to testify about the accepted 
standard of care and how that standard was breached under the facts of this case. That testimony 
would have been helpful in assisting the jury reach a verdict on the ultimate issue which was 
whether Ricci or Shoultz was negligent. (R. 434-35). 
Ricci argues that expert testimony pertaining to the application of the Skier's 
Responsibility Code would not have been "helpful" to the jury. (Reply Br. of Appellee at 22). 
However, the scope of Rule 702 is broad. Prior to the enactment of the rules of evidence, some 
courts rejected expert testimony unless it related to an issue "not within the common knowledge 
of the average layman." JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 13.02[2] (1991). 
Such an interpretation, however, is incompatible with the helpfulness standard of Rule 702. Id. 
There is no bright line separating issues within the comprehension of jurors from those that are 
not. Therefore, experts may be able to "add specialized knowledge that would be helpful" even 
when jurors are well equipped to make judgments based on their common experience. Id. 
Ricci also argues that the expert testimony would not have been "helpful" because 
the experts never "saw Ricci before the accident, and none saw the accident." (Reply Br. of 
Appellee at 22). The trial court, as part of its ruling, erroneously relied upon that argument. 
However, Bonar did not need to see the skiing accident in order to testify about the application 
and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of the case. Utah R. of Evid. 
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703-705 (1997); £f. Shurtleffv. JavTuft & Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980)(expert who 
previously worked on backhoe could testify that backhoe had been maintained in a proper 
condition by defendant even though the expert never observed, nor did he have personal 
knowledge of, any specific acts by defendant that would constitute improper maintenance). 
Here, Bonar could have testified that Ricci, as the "uphill" skier, had a duty to avoid 
the downhill skier, and Ricci's failure to do so was the cause of the accident. Bonar's testimony 
could have assisted the jury in helping them determine what it means to be the "uphill" skier. 
Likewise, he could have assisted the jury in helping them determine what it means, according to 
the code, to "ski in control" and in such a manner so as to avoid other downhill skiers. 
Moreover, Bonar could have offered testimony as to the application of the code based upon the 
two versions of events presented at trial by both Ricci and Shoultz. In such a manner, his 
testimony would have added specialized knowledge that would be "helpful" although some of 
the jurors may have been well equipped to make judgments based on their common experience 
of skiing. Again, however, skiing represents a sport in which not all jurors will be familiar, even 
in Utah. The testimony would have been relevant to the ultimate issue and helpful to the jury in 
making its determination. 
In turn, Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicate that the facts upon which 
an expert bases an opinion may be "made known to the expert at or before the hearing." So long 
as the facts are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field" the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. Utah R. Evid. 703 (1997). Thus, although Bonar's 
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opinions could have been elicited through the use of hypothetical questions, See Utah Dept. of 
Trans, v. 6200 South Associates. 872 P.2d 462 (Utah App. 1994) cert denied. 890 P.2d 1034 
(Utah 1994), such procedure would not have been mandatory. Further, it may not have been 
necessary for Bonar to even give the reasons for his opinions or inferences. The reasons for his 
opinion could have been explored by Ricci on cross-examination. Utah R. Evid. 705 (1997); see 
also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 6272 
(West 1997)(In the name of efficiency, Rules 703 and 705 shift the burden to the cross-examiner 
to reveal the bases of an expert's opinion and the deficiencies therein). Any deficiencies that 
Ricci may have perceived would have gone to the weight of the evidence, so long as Bonar's 
opinions pertaining to the Skier's Responsibility Code were reliable. See Utah R. of Evid. 702 
(1997). 
Finally, Ricci argues that the expert testimony would not have been "helpful" 
because Bonar's testimony would merely "tell the jury what result to reach." (Reply Br. of 
Appellee at 23). Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly provides that testimony in the 
form of opinion or inference "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704 (1997). In this respect, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
The old shibboleth that an expert should not be permitted to invade the 
province of the jury has been largely displaced by recognition that 
opinions, if based on an adequate foundation, are helpful and that the 
powerful tool of cross-examination and the jury's good judgment are 
sufficient to place the opinion in proper perspective. 
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Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah 1979). Unfortunately, the jury here was 
never able to place the expert opinion in the "proper perspective." 
Of course, "an expert cannot give an opinion as to whether an individual was 
'negligent' because such an opinion would require a legal conclusion." Davidson v. Prince. 813 
P.2d 1225,1231 (Utah App. 1991). cert denied. 826 P2d 681 (Utah 1991) (the excluded 
testimony was an answer to a specific question which would appear on the verdict form). 
However, "there is no bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that 
call for over-broad legal responses." Id. 
In this case, Bonar would have testified that, in his expert opinion, Ricci failed to 
adhere to the Skier's Responsibility Code. That proposed testimony is significantly different 
from the scenario embraced by this Court in Davidson and State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah 
App. 1996), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) (expert testified that under Utah law, 
defendant's actions were impermissible). In this case, both parties recognize that violation of the 
Skier's Responsibility Code would not have been conclusive on the standard of care. (Reply Br. 
of Appellee at 18 n. 5). The jury instructions, too, indicated that the code was evidence of the 
"care an ordinary, prudent person would use under the circumstances." (R. 232). Thus, Bonar 
could have testified that Ricci breached the ski industry's accepted standard of care as 
promulgated in the Skier's Responsibility Code. Such testimony, although embracing an 
ultimate issue, would not have merely told the jury what result to reach. It would have been 
proper under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Godesky v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 
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541 (Utah 1984)(experts testified that defendant violated four provisions of National Electric 
Safety Code; violation of such was evidence of negligence); Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. 
Fitzgerald. 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978)(violation of statute is evidence of negligence); Hall v. 
Archer-Daniel-Midland Co. 491 N.E.2d 879 (111. App. 1986), rev'd on other grnds.. 524 N.E.2d 
586 (111. 1988)(expert properly permitted to testify that defendants violated a duty to plaintiff 
under OSHA regulations). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PREJUDICED 
SHOULTZ 
This Court has recognized that it is not easy to tell when an error should be regarded 
as prejudicial. Berrett 830 P.2d at 293. This Court has, however, reasoned that "if we cannot, 
with any degree of assurance, affirm that the use of such evidence would not have been helpful to 
the [defendant], the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing him to have a full and fair 
presentation of his cause to the jury." Id. Although not determinative2, some indication of the 
prejudicial effect of the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony must "be found in the fact that 
counsel thought the matter of sufficient consequence that he objected to the admission of the 
evidence." Berrett, 830 P.2d at 297 (quoting Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp.. 
318 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1957)); (See R. 120, 427, 791). 
2
 See Macris & Associates Inc. v. Images & Attitudes. Inc.. 941 P.2d 636, 643 (Utah App. 
1997) 
10 
One thing is clear from the record: The jury was not able to hear Bonar's ultimate 
conclusion that Ricci violated important skiing rules as published in the Skier's Responsibility 
Code. The exclusion of such expert opinion invited "misunderstanding [and] confusion in the 
jurors' minds that may not be detectable or correctable . . . . " Edwards. 597 P.2d at 1330. The 
jury was allowed to speculate in an area in which it was not as knowledgeable as an expert. See 
id. The jury never heard expert opinion testimony concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code's 
application to a "downhill skier" as opposed to an "uphill skier." (R. 793-94). The jury never 
heard expert testimony concerning the code provision with respect to "loss of control," or that 
"loss of control" does not mean merely falling while skiing.3 In other words, the jury had to 
interpret and apply the "rules" of the sport without the aid of an expert who was extremely 
knowledgeable regarding to the application and interpretation of those rules. Skiing is not a 
sport in which all jurors have a common knowledge. The jury, therefore, was left to speculate on 
whether "loss of control" meant merely falling while skiing rather than skiing out-of-control or 
recklessly. See Edwards. 597 P.2d at 1330. 
In his Reply Brief, Ricci argues that Shoultz could have argued his interpretation of 
the code to the jury in closing arguments. (Reply Br. of Appellee at 24 n. 11). Such an assertion 
is incorrect. Shoultz's arguments concerning any interpretation of the code to the facts of the 
3
 In his Reply Brief, Ricci claims that Shoultz did not fall. However, the record clearly 
indicates that, according to Ricci's version, Shoultz "caught an edge," veered to his left and 
began to fall. (R. 589). Ricci testified, "It seemed like it was only one second. It was fast. He 
just had trouble and he was going down." Id- For purposes of this Reply Brief and Shoultz's 
original brief, beginning to fall, and actually falling, are the same thing. 
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case would have been objectionable because such an interpretation was not in evidence. (See R. 
214). In other words, the trial court's ruling which excluded expert testimony regarding the 
application of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of this case precluded Shoultz's 
counsel from arguing his interpretation to the jury. In sum, accurate fact-finding was not 
enhanced by the exclusion of Shoultz's expert testimony. Because this Court cannot, "with any 
degree of assurance/' affirm that the use of expert testimony would not have been helpful to 
Shoultz's case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing him to have a "full and fair 
presentation of his cause to the jury." Berrett, 830 P.2d at 297. 
CONCLUSION 
Shoultz was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling which excluded expert testimony 
concerning the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. Such testimony 
would have been helpful in assisting the jury to reach its ultimate conclusion. Therefore, if this 
Court reverses the trial court's ruling on Shoultz's motion for J.N.O.V. or alternative new trial, 
Shoultz respectfully requests that this Court order a new trial because the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding expert testimony and Shoultz was prejudiced by that erroneous ruling. 
DATED this 2 l day of February, 1998. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Paul M. Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
Darren K. Nelson 
Attorneys for Appellee & Cross-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
14 
JLJAPIS, GRAY & STEGALL, ^.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
175 WEST 200 SOUTH. SUITE 2004 
PAUL H. LIAPIS TELECOPIER 
DEAN L. GRAY SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 (801)532-7394 
WILLIAM A. STEGALL. JR. 
TELEPHONE (801)532-6996 
January 30, 1996 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Gary Ricci v. Charles Shoultz, M.D. 
Civil No. 940930267PI 
Fireman's Fund Claim No. B790L94022888 
Dear Jeff: 
At the direction of Dr. Shoultz1 insurance carrier, Fire-
man's Fund, I have filed with the court an offer of judgment in 
the amount of $3,000. A copy of the offer is enclosed. 
I request that you provide responses or supplemental re-
sponses with regard to the following discovery requests: 
1. Defendant's interrogatory 4(d) requested 
information concerning Mr. Riccifs claimed medical 
expenses. In his answers dated August 10, 1994, he 
responded that "plaintiff is not in possession of bills 
at this time and reserves the right to supplement this 
answer to interrogatory. It is my understanding from 
Mr. Ricci's testimony at his continued deposition on 
January 24, 1996, that he has not had any medical 
treatment related to the claimed injuries for several 
months. Accordingly, he should be in possession of any 
and all bills relating to treatment of the injuries he 
claims to have suffered in this accident. Please 
furnish copies of all such bills to me as soon as 
possible. 
2. Defendant's interrogatory 7 related to Mr. 
Ricci's gross income as reported for federal income tax 
purposes for the years 1989 through 1993. At Mr. 
Ricci's deposition on February 14, 1995, you stated you 
would provide to me copies of the tax return for 1989 
through 1993. (Ricci depo. page 15, line 23, 24.) At 
the continued deposition, you indicated you would 
provide a copy of Mr. Ricci's 1994 tax return to me. 
Please furnish copies of all of the requested tax 
returns as soon as possible. Additionally, if Mr. 
Ricci intends to claim any loss of income in 1995, I 
would appreciate receiving documentation concerning his 
income in that year. 
Jeffrey D. Eisen. 3rg 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
January 30, 1996 
Page 2 
3. Defendant's interrogatory 14 asked whether 
you had hired "any experts to determine the cause of 
the incident or to reconstruct the incident. " You 
objected to the interrogatory as work-product, but, 
without waiving the objection, stated "none at this 
time," Please advise me as to whether your response to 
interrogatory 14 remains accurate. 
Following Mr. Riccifs deposition, you requested that we each 
identify our trial witnesses by February 7, 1996. I presently 
anticipate that I will, or may, call the following: 
1. Plaintiff. 
2. Defendant. 
3. Jennifer Ricci. 
4. Gary Pinnell. 
5. Patrick Kenny. 
6. Karl Boyer. 
7. Bob Bonar. 
8. J. K. Etheridge, defendant's treating ortho-
pedic surgeon. 
9. Stephen J. Nicolatus, an economist, to ad-
dress plaintiff's lost earnings/earning capacity 
claims. 
10. Any individual who provided medical/health 
care treatment to plaintiff on and after April 12, 
1994. 
I have attempted to make the foregoing list of trial wit-
nesses as complete as possible, but there may be changes once Mr. 
Ricci responds to the discovery requests. 
Very truly yours, 
WAS/tt 
cc: Richard K. Rediger 
Charles Shoultz, M.D. 
Vance Dunnam 
William A. Stegall, Jr, 
W I L C O X , D E W S N U P <& K I N G 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
2 0 2 0 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
3 6 SOUTH STATE STREET 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 8*111 
T E L E P H O N E 
(SOI) 5 3 3 - 0 4 0 0 
F A C S I M I L E 
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 4 2 1 8 
February 2,1996 
W. B R E N T W I L C O X 
RALPH L. D E W S N U P 
C O L I N P. K I N G 
D A V I D R. O L S E N 
E D W A R D B. HAVAS 
J E F F R E Y D. E I S E N B E R G 
R U T H LYBBERT 
ALAN W. M O R T E N S E N * 
•ALSO ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
AND COLORADO 
William Stegall, Esq. 
Liapis, Gray & Stegall 
175 West 200 South #2004 
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RE: Ricci v. Shoultz 
Dear Bill: 
Thanks for your letter of January 30, 1996 which contained your witness list. I 
attempted to located J.K. Ethridge in the Salt Lake physicians directory and could not 
locate him. I am assuming he is someone who treated your client for his alleged 
injuries in Texas. 
To begin with, I would like to know what relevant testimony Mr. Ethridge has to 
offer. Your client has not made a claim for damages in this case. If you believe that 
the type and location of your client's injuries is relevant to determining the cause of the 
accident, I have no difficulty with your client putting that evidence in and in fact, I 
probably would not object to introduction of medical records to substantiate that. 
However, if Mr. Ethridge is going to opine on how the accident happened, I certainly 
want the opportunity to take his deposition and voir dire him. I think it would be very 
unlikely he could ever be qualified to testify concerning the cause of the accident. In 
any event, please clarify your intentions and make arrangements to give me the 
opportunity to depose Mr. Ethridge at a convenient time prior to trial. 
truly yours, 
JDE:sk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this i i _ day of February, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellee & Cross-Appellant was mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to: 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
36 South State, #2020 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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